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To date, system research has focused on designing security 
mechanisms to protect systems access although their usability has 
rarely been investigated.  This paper reports a study in which users’ 
perceptions of password mechanisms were investigated through 
questionnaires and interviews.  Analysis of the questionnaires shows 
that many users report problems, linked to the number of passwords 
and frequency of password use.  In-depth analysis of the interview data 
revealed that the degree to which users conform to security 
mechanisms depends on their perception of security levels, information 
sensitivity and compatibility with work practices. Security mechanisms 
incompatible with these perceptions may be circumvented by users 
and thereby undermine system security overall. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Most organisations try to protect their systems from unauthorised access, usually through passwords.  
Considerable resources are spent designing secure authentication mechanisms, but the number of 
security breaches and problems is still increasing (DeAlvare, 1990; Gordon, 1995; Hitchings, 1995).  
Unauthorised access to systems, and resulting theft of information or misuse of the system, is usually 
due to hackers “cracking” user passwords, or obtaining them through social engineering.  System 
security, unlike other fields of system development, has to date been regarded as an entirely technical 
issue - little research has been done on usability or human factors related to use of security 
mechanisms.  Hitchings (1995) concludes that this narrow perspective has produced security 
mechanisms which are much less effective than they are generally thought to be.  Davis & Price (1987) 
point out that, since security is designed, implemented, used and breached by people, human factors 
should be considered in the design of security mechanism.  It seems that currently hackers pay more 
attention to human factors than security designers do.  The technique of social engineering, for instance 
- obtaining passwords by deception and persuasion - exploits users’ lack of security awareness.  
Hitchings (1995) also suggests that organisational factors ought to be considered when assessing 
security systems.  The aim of the study described in this paper was to identify usability and 
organisational factors which affect the use of passwords.  The following section provides a brief 
overview of authentication systems along with usability and organisational issues which have been 
identified to date. 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Confidentiality is a key element in information security, with user authentication as the main 
mechanism to obtain this (Parker, 1992).  Authentication procedures have traditionally been divided 
into two different stages.  User identification (User ID) initially identifies the user interacting with the 
system.  As it is merely a means of specifying who the user is, this id does not have to be secured. At 
the second - user authentication stage - the user has to be verified as the legitimate user of the ID; the 
password used as the means of authentication has to be secret.  
Originally, passwords were system-generated to ensure users employed “secure” 
combinations of characters.  Most users, however, found these passwords hard to remember, and 
therefore tended to write them down.  Furthermore, security risks were identified in the distribution of 
system-generated passwords.  Both of these reasons have lead to user-generated passwords as the most 
widely used process for password production.  In addition to one-word passwords, there are a number 
of other authentication mechanisms currently in use: 
• Passphrases (phrase required instead of a word); 
• Cognitive passwords (question-and-answer session of personal details); 
• Associative passwords (a series of words & associations) and 
• Personal Identification Numbers (PINs).   
This paper investigates user-ID and user-generated passwords, the most widely-used 
password mechanisms.  The level of security provided by this can vary greatly, depending on the 
individual user’s password design expertise and security awareness.  The US Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS, 1985) suggest that there are several criteria that should be used to assure 
different levels of password security.  Password composition, for example, relates the level of a 
password’s security to the size of the character set from which it has been chosen.  An alpha-numeric 
password is therefore more secure than one composed of letters only.  Short password lifetime - i.e. 
changing passwords frequently - is suggested to reduce the risk associated with undetected illicit use of 
a “compromised” password.  Finally, password ownership is noted as an important aspect of its 
security.  The FIPS suggest that individual ownership:  
• increases individual accountability; 
• reduces illicit usage; 
• allows establishment of system usage audit trails; 
• reduces the requirement for frequent password changes dues to group membership 
fluctuations.  
There is indeed evidence that many users do not follow secure password construction.  
DeAlvare (1988) found that once a password is chosen, a user is unlikely to change it until it has been 
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shown to be compromised.  This research was continued in 1990 to show that, if allowed, most users 
will tend to construct passwords that contain as few characters as possible.  These observations cannot 
be disputed, but the conclusion that these observed behaviours are due to users being inherently 
careless and therefore insecure ought to be reconsidered.  Security departments try to counteract users’ 
“inherently insecure” behaviour with system-based mechanisms such as password expiry and 
construction restrictions, assuming that forcing users to comply with security measures will reduce 
insecure behaviour.  Again, the notion that desired behaviour can be enforced may work in a military 
environment, but this fits less well with modern  organisations and work practices.   
The guiding principles of system security have determined the type of security problems 
identified and their approach to possible solutions.  The tendency is to respond to security problems by 
enforcing more restrictive authentication regimes, such as:  
 
• increasing change regimes (change password once a month); 
• longer and more complex passwords (alpha-numeric & required length);  
• reduction in allowed input error rates.   
 
Whether these mechanisms have resulted in more secure user behaviour has not been 
empirically confirmed.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that their effect may be the opposite of what was 
intended: the more restrictive mechanisms are, the more likely it is that users will circumvent them, 
resulting in behaviours which are even less secure.  The reason for this apparent paradox is usability as 
more restrictions in authentication mechanisms create more usability problems.  Carroll (1996) pointed 
out that the very characteristics which make a password more secure also make it less memorable.  
This has produced efforts to identify mechanisms for generating memorable yet secure passwords 
(DeAlvare, 1988; Barton and Barton 1988).  The impact of these recommendations seems to have been 
limited; most users do not seem to be aware of them.  
 
 
1.2 Usability issues in password systems 
 
The aim of this study is to identify human and organisational factors which impact on the security and 
usability of password systems.  Security is defined as reducing unauthorised access to information or 
systems;  usability in the password domain is defined in terms of memorability and perceived 
overheads. The study was conducted in two parts.  In the first part of the study, a detailed questionnaire 
on security and usability of password authentication systems was designed to elicit descriptions of user 
behaviour and problems related to the use of passwords.  The web-based questionnaire was completed 
by 139 respondents, half of which were employees in Organisation A, the other half were Internet 
users from around the world.  The questionnaire results are reported and discussed1 in Section 2.  The 
quantitative research seeks to identify relationships between users password memorability, frequency 
of password usage, automaticity in entering a password and perceptions of the need for security levels. 
The issues most frequently raised in the questionnaires were followed up with in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with 30 users, 15 from Organisation A and 15 from Organisation B.  Section 3 explains how 
the interviews have been analysed using a qualitative method from social sciences called grounded 
theory, and presents the resulting model of system and organisational factors along with their impact 
on security and usability.  Implications of the findings are discussed in Section 4 and recommendations 
made for improving authentication processes. 
 
 
2 Questionnaire study 
 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
139 responses were received, half of which were from organisation A.  The other half from 
organisations throughout the world.  Participants were recruited via email and web interest groups 
which could be argued restricted subject sampling to technologically biased respondents.  It should be 
                                                 
1 Further relationships were reviewed but few of any interest were found 
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noted however that respondents were varied in both computer (less than 1 year to 10 years) and 
password (1 to over 10 passwords - some stating over 30 passwords) experience. For security reasons, 
participants’ personal details were automatically anonymised and personal detail sections of the 
questionnaire were not always completed.  
 
2.1.1 Instruments  
As there has been little previous research on this particular issue, a pilot questionnaire was 
used to obtain initial quantitative and qualitative data.  Although this questionnaire took a broad 
approach to the subject area, it focused on password related user behaviours, in particular memorability 
problems. Results from the open ended sections of the questionnaire, however, suggested that this 
narrow approach was not addressing key problems with password usage as a user authentication 
device. 
 
2.1.1 Procedure 
The questionnaire was placed on the web and once completed was anonymised before being 
automatically returned, via email, for analysis.  
 
 
2.2 Results 
 
The significant relationships observed in the study are summarised in Table 1.  There is a 
significant (P<0.05) correlation between “infrequently used passwords” and “frequent memory 
problems” with the same password, and between “frequently used passwords” and “infrequent 
memory problems”.  There is also a significant (P<0.005) correlation between “have to think first” 
(before password recall) and “frequent memory problems” with the same password.  The opposite end 
of this relationship is between “automatic” (password recall) and “infrequent memory problems”.   An 
interesting point is the significant (P<0.05) correlation between “desire to decrease security” and 
“frequent memory problems” with the same password. 
 
 Responses Correlation 
Coefficient 
Significance
Password usage by Memory problems 137 -.2204 P<0.05 
Automaticity by Memory problems 136 -.6338   P<0.005 
Required security changes by Memory 
problems 
122 -.2079 P<0.05 
 
Table 1:   Mean correlation coefficients2 between automaticity, memorability and 
frequency of password usage 
 
 50% of respondents wrote their passwords down in one form or another.  It was also found 
that 50% of respondents using more than one password had produced a method to construct ”related” 
passwords, i.e. all or most of their passwords had a common theme or domain.  In fact, this applied to 
all users who answered these question - almost half left these questions blank. 
The results clearly suggest that password memorability is partially reliant on frequency of use, 
which produces automaticity. This would tie in with observations on encoding specificity and the 
implicit vs. explicit memory models (Graf and Mandler, 1984; Graf and Schacter, 1985).  Encoding 
specificity suggests that to retrieve information efficiently, the form of password construction should 
match the retrieval procedure; a semantically meaningful password should be retrieved semantically).  
The explicit vs. implicit memory model suggests that semantically stored passwords (those that have a 
meaning) are best for explicitly retrieved material (thinking about the item to be recalled).  However, if 
a password is frequently used and therefore automatically (implicitly) retrieved, a structural 
construction (the shape of the word or the position of keys on the keyboard) is more effective for 
retrieval purposes.   
                                                 
2 (All variables in above analysis are means for all password systems using a 2-tailed Significance 
using a Spearman’s Rho test for ordinal related data) 
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 The open-ended sections of the questionnaire suggested there were other factors which 
influenced user behaviour or led to user problems.  It was concluded that further qualitative analysis 
was required to comprehensively investigate relevant issues.  
 
 
3 Qualitative analysis 
 
3.1 First-pass analysis: method 
 
The first set of 15 semi-structured in-depth interviews lasted approx. 30 minutes and were conducted 
with users in Organisation A.  Respondents had varying levels of password expertise, both over period 
and frequency of use.  Participants were asked a series of semi-structured questions that covered issues 
of password generation and recall along with more general system and organisational factors.  The 
interview format allowed participants to introduce new issues to the discussion that they regarded as 
important. 
 
 
3.2 First-pass analysis: results  
 
The initial analysis of the interviews and free-format answers in the questionnaire was guided by 
frequency and  fundamentality of the issues raised by the users.  This produced 4 factors influencing 
effective password usage.  Problem areas for password usability were multiple passwords, password 
content, users’ perceptions of security in the organisation and information sensitivity. 
 
3.2.1 Multiple passwords  
Many users have to remember multiple passwords, i.e. they have to use different passwords for 
different applications and/or change password frequently because of password expiry mechanisms. A 
high number of passwords reduces memorability, increases insecure work-practices (e.g. writing 
passwords down) and poor password design (e.g. using password as their password), as illustrated in 
the following quotes: 
 
“Constantly changing passwords results in very simple choices which are easy to 
guess or break within seconds of using 'Cracker'3.  Hence there is no security.” 
 
 “But basically because I was forced into changing it every month I had to write it 
down.” 
 
Many users devise their own method for beating memorability problems such as related passwords - 
linking their passwords via some common element.  Such methods are devised in response to password 
expiry mechanisms, and by users who have to have different passwords for different applications.  
Many of these users consciously implemented their own security by varying elements in these linked 
passwords (e.g. tom1, tom2, tom3).  However the results show that, rather than improving 
memorability and security, this decreases password memorability.  This has been identified as due to 
the within-list interference (Wickens, 1992) of related passwords which causes users to write 
passwords down which in turn reduces password security levels. 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Password content 
Password content is defined here as the character content of the password reviewed in terms of its 
memorability and security.  Initial results found that users’ knowledge of  secure password design was 
very inadequate.  This leads users to create rules and judgements on password design strategies which 
are anything but secure.  Words contained in the dictionary and names are the most vulnerable form of 
password.  These results showed that many users do not realise this: 
 
                                                 
3 A password dictionary checker 
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“I mean I would have thought that if you picked something like your wife's 
Christian name or something then the chances of a complete stranger guessing 
********* in my case were pretty remote.” 
 
3.2.3 Security perceptions 
Analysis of the results revealed that users perceptions of security levels and potential threats was a key 
element in motivating their work-practices.  Without clear feedback from the organisation, users 
construct their own model of security threats and importance of security.  The two extracts below 
illustrate users’ misconceptions in their perceptions of both organisational security and possible 
breaches: 
“I don't think that hacking is a problem I've had no visibility of hacking that may 
go on. None at all.” 
 
“I think that security problems are more by word of mouth than computer 
problems” 
 
3.2.4 Information sensitivity 
The study identified that users’ security behaviour often depends on their perceptions of the 
information sensitivity.  Users identified certain systems as worthy of secure password practices, whilst 
others were perceived as “not important enough”.  In the absence of guidance, users concluded that 
confidential information about individuals (personnel files, email) was sensitive; but commercially 
sensitive information, such as customer records and financial data, were often not regarded as 
sensitive.  Some users stated that they liked the classification of printed documents (e.g. Confidential, 
Not for Circulation). This indicates that users need guidance on information sensitivity and rules for 
levels of protection. 
 
 
3.3 In-depth analysis: grounded theory 
  
The initial approach to the qualitative analysis ignored a wealth of information in the data.  Further 
analysis using grounded theory methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) enabled us 
to resolve apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in users’ statements.  This analysis of the 
qualitative and quantitative data was then used to build a model of users’ password behaviour.  Social 
science methodologies have been used for some years in HCI particularly in the field of CSCW 
(Suchman, 1987; Fafchamps, 1991).  Unlike other social science methodologies, ‘grounded theory’ 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990) provides a more focused, structured approach to research (closer in some 
ways to quantitative methods) which is why it has been termed a post positivistic method (Stevenson & 
Cooper, 1997).  We have not found any published examples of its application to HCI problems, but 
found it matched the requirements of this study for a number of reasons:- 
 
1. This study uncovered a complex web of variables interacting to produce users’ password  
behaviour.  Grounded theory was able to descriptively relate these variables in a way that 
enabled possible intervention points to be identified.  
2. In a field where there has been little previous research, the direction of the study could be 
biased by the researcher.  Grounded theory enables research to be grounded in the data 
obtained so that the validity of the theories produced are increased.  
3. The structured format of grounded theory encourages the building of a framework and 
theories that are grounded in the data which then improves the external validity of the 
research conducted. 
 
The analysis provided a step-by-step account of password usage problems and possible 
intervention points.  A framework of password usage was produced which was substantiated by a 
further 15 in-depth interviews in organisation B.  As the findings from the various studies are too 
numerous to discuss in detail, we only provide a top level diagram of the model (see Figure 3) and a 
description of it through a detailed walk-through (see Table 2).  Items that are of particular interest in 
the efficiency of password usage are also presented (Sections 3.4.1 & 3.4.2).   
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3.4 In-depth analysis: results 
 
3.4.1 Security perceptions: solving apparent contradictions  
Several of the interviews show users identifying one perception of their behaviour and then later 
stating the opposite.  Such contradictions make it hard to establish relationships between factors which 
influence user behaviour.  Contradictory statements could be caused by users’ being unsure of their 
own descriptions, or discussing complex issues which involve several factors.  The application of 
grounded theory techniques for analysing the free-format statements on the questionnaires and the 
interview data identified the latter as the case.  An example of an apparent contradiction is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Password 
disclosure ↑
↓ Information sensitivity ↓ Threats 
Security  ↑
A B
Perceived 
Security  ↓
Actual  
Key 
↑ Increased 
↓   Decreased 
 
Figure 1: User behaviours produced by perceptions of security levels 
 
A) If users perceive the organisation’s general security level as low (decreased), this decreases their 
perception of how sensitive the information protected  is.  This, in turn, increases insecure work 
procedures such as password disclosure. (“Well, if the information isn’t important, why make a big 
fuss about keeping your password secret?”) 
B) If users perceive the organisation’s general security level as high (increased) this then decreases 
their overall perception of threats to the information.  This, in turn, also increases insecure work 
procedures such as password disclosure (“Well, security for getting into the site is so tight, there’s 
no harm in writing down my password and leaving it on my desk.”) 
3.4.2 Work practices: the full story  
The analysis revealed the importance of compatibility between work practices and password 
procedures.  Organisation A forced users to have individually owned passwords for group working. 
This was perceived as incompatible with working procedures whilst shared passwords for teams, with 
shared information, was considered a compatible replacement (see section A in Figure 2).  Further 
research with users in a comparative organisation (see section B in Figure 2) revealed almost the 
opposite problem and yet the same cause: Enforced group passwords for individual personal 
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information were passionately rejected by users, perceived as incompatible with the nature of the work 
and information involved in it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Users perceptions of work practices & system procedures compatibility 
 
 
 
This analysis using the grounded theory approach has enabled detailed models of password 
usability and security to be formulated (see Figure 3).  Table 2 provides a rule-based version of the 
model represented in Figure 3.  
Compatible  
Procedures 
Incompatibl
e  
P d
Trust
(A) Group work / 
shared information
Shared 
passwords 
Individually 
enforced 
passwords 
Work 
practices
Individual  
enforced 
passwords 
(B) Individual work / 
private information 
Shared 
passwords 
9 
Figure 3: High level story-line of  password usage 
 PASSWORD USAGE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information  
Sensitivity
Password  
enforced procedures 
External Factors 
System  Procedures 
SECURITY Incompatible Compatibl
Incompatible Compatible
Compatible WORK PRACTICES Incompatible 
Circumvent Conform 
System Factors 
Multiple PasswordsRestrictions 
User  Procedures
CONTENT Not MeaningfulMeaningful 
Relate Unrelated RELATIONSHIP 
 
Table 2 :  PASSWORD USAGE [High Level Story-line - Walkthrough] 
 
1. SYSTEM FACTORS 
A) ARE:- 
1. Password restriction mechanisms 
2. Passwords for multiple applications and  multiple changes over time. 
B) Have USER PROCEDURES that:- 
1. CONFORM with system factors to produce:- 
a) UNRELATED PASSWORD CONTENT these are:- 
I.  Non-words 
II.  Words that contain unrelated elements and that are not  
     automatically meaningful. 
b) MULTIPLE PASSWORDS which are:- 
I.  Passwords that are totally independent and not related in  
     anyway to one another.  
2. CIRCUMVENT system factors to produce:- 
a) RELATED PASSWORD CONTENT these are:- 
I. Meaningful words either personally or generally  identifiable. 
II. Related content within the password (e.g.abc123) 
b) RELATED PASSWORDS (JOINED PASSWORDS) these are:- 
I. Related elements across multiple passwords. Either across 
passwords for applications or across changes in passwords for a 
single application or both. 
 
2. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
A) ARE:- 
1.  Information’s perceived sensitivity or importance. 
2.  Enforced password practice so that passwords are perceived to be allocated to the 
individual or the group. 
B) Have ORGANISATIONAL PROCEDURES that are:- 
1. COMPATIBLE with users perceptions to produce:- 
a) COMPATIBLE SECURITY these are:- 
I.  Where sensitive information has a high security where there are 
high perceived threats 
II.  Where unimportant information has a low security where there 
are low perceived threats. 
b) COMPATIBLE WORK PRACTICES these are:- 
I.  Where employees work individually with personal or sensitive 
information and have individual passwords. 
II.  Where employees work in groups sharing information and have 
group or shared passwords. 
2. INCOMPATIBLE with users perceptions to produce:- 
a)  INCOMPATIBLE SECURITY that is:- 
I.  INSECURE 
i)  Where sensitive information is poorly secured with 
low security levels.  
ii)  Where Perceived threats are also high with non-
sensitive information and low security. 
II.   SECURE  
i)  where non-sensitive information is well secured with 
high security levels. With perceived threats being high 
or low. 
b)  INCOMPATIBLE WORK PRACTICE that are:- 
I.  Where group work with shared information has perceived 
individual enforced passwords. 
II.  Where individual work with personal or sensitive information 
has perceived group enforced passwords. 
4 Discussion  
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This analysis has identified two main problem in password usage; password mechanisms that users 
perceive as forcing them to produce behaviours that circumvent them and organisational factors that 
are perceived as incompatible with working procedures.  These problems are due to a lack of 
communication between security departments and users -  users do not understand security issues and 
system departments lack an understanding of users’ perceptions, tasks and needs.  Resulting 
perceptions (by security departments) of users’ as ‘inherently insecure’ and of security mechanisms 
and procedures (by users) as illogical are then increased, de-motivating naturally secure user 
behaviours.  In this section we examine the consequences of this in detail and discuss intervention 
points for improving communications. 
 
 
4.1 Users lack security knowledge  
 
Parker (1992) points out that a major doctrine in password security, adopted from the military, is the 
need-to-know principle.  The assumption being that the more known about a security mechanism, the 
easier it is to attack.  Part of the defence is therefore to information only to those who “need to know”. 
A similar approach to security is taken by many business organisations today: those responsible for 
system security argue that explaining the rationale behind security mechanisms increases its 
vulnerability.  Many security departments see users as “inherently insecure” which produces a 
tendency to tell users as little as possible.  One clear finding from this study is that “insecure” user 
behaviour is often caused by a lack of understanding.  This can be seen in a number of user 
observations with password content, security perceptions and information sensitivity (see 3.2). 
In many organisations, system-generated passwords have been replaced by user-generated 
ones.  This means that the responsibility for creating secure passwords has been shifted to the users; 
but the “need-to-know” policy of many security departments means that known rules for creating 
secure passwords are rarely communicated to users.  Many users are being asked to complete a skilled 
design job without adequate training and little on-line guidance.  Our data shows that, lacking basic 
knowledge, users make their own judgements about which practices are secure, and these judgements 
are often wildly inadequate.  
 The grounded theory analysis also revealed that many users confused user identification (user 
ID’s) and the password sections of the authentication process.  Without knowledge of the 
authentication process, users assumed that these ID’s were another form of password to be secured and 
recalled in the same manner.  This maybe due to the fact that many user ID's are often non-words 
without meaning.  Even if the user ID’s are related to the users’ name, they differ in format for the 
varying applications used.  This in turn increases users’ perceived mental workload associated with 
passwords.  Lack of understanding here increases the perceived overhead, which in turn reduces users’ 
motivation to comply with suggested behaviour. 
 Finally, users have a poor understanding of password security breaches and risks.  Users 
perceived threats to be low because of a lack of visible risk feedback.  Users’ lack of understanding 
also lead to the general misconception that password cracking was completed on a personal basis: 
perceptions of threats were found to decrease as they perceived their insignificance in the system.  
 
 
4.2 A lack of user-centred design in system security 
 
 This study has identified that many mechanisms designed to improve system security can in 
practice decrease it.  Lack of communication with users also leads to a lack of a user-centred design of 
security mechanisms.  Many mechanisms create overheads for users or require user behaviour which is 
unworkable.  It is hardly surprising to find that many will try to circumvent such mechanisms. 
 Change regimes are employed to reduce the impact that an undetected security breach could 
have on an organisation.  However, our findings suggest that change regimes reduce overall password 
security.  Users required to frequently change their passwords were found to be producing passwords 
with less secure content and disclosing their passwords more frequently.  Requiring users to have a 
large number of passwords (for multiple applications and change regimes) creates serious usability 
problems.  Reduced memorability causes password disclosure and crackable passwords (see Section 
3.2.1). Many users feel they are forced into circumventing security procedures which decreases their 
security motivation.  Hackers using social engineering techniques rely on a lowered security 
motivation among users to breach security mechanisms. 
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 Ultimately, a lack of user-centred design in password mechanisms forces users to circumvent 
procedures.  Users are aware that their behaviour is insecure and it is this awareness that decreases 
their security motivation.  The grounded theory model has identified that this can then lead to a 
spiralling decline in users secure behaviour (“oh well my behaviours are not secure anyway so it 
doesn’t really matter how lax I become.”) 
 
 
4.3 Motivating users security awareness 
 
 The analysis revealed that users’ perception of security threats was motivating or de-
motivating as far as their security behaviour was concerned.  A lack of organisational feedback on 
security issues was also found to de-motivate users’ security awareness.  However, one of the major 
factors de-motivating users was a lack of user-centred design in security mechanisms. 
 It has been suggested by the US Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS, 1985) that 
individual ownership of passwords increases accountability and decreases illicit usage of passwords, 
because of the possibility of audit trailing - a by product of authentication. We found, however, that 
most users are not aware that auditing of system use can be linked to passwords.  Further evidence 
shows that this is probably for the best, since those users who did realise this possibility circumvented 
auditing by using another person’s password - not necessarily because their actions broke rules, but 
“just in case, so someone else gets the blame if things go wrong”.  FIPS (1985) states that shared 
passwords for groups are insecure.  However, our results indicate that they should be used if work is 
carried out by a team.  If a password mechanism is incompatible with users’ work practises, they 
perceive the security mechanism as “not sensible” and will circumvent it (e.g. by disclosing it to other 
group members).  This can lead to a perception that all password mechanisms are “pointless”, and are 
therefore circumvented. 
 It is important to challenge the view that users are never motivated to behave in a secure 
manner.  Our results show that the majority of users were security-conscious, as long as they perceive 
the need for these behaviours e.g. because of obvious external threats or information sensitivity.  These 
findings are supported by research within Organisation B, where both physical and computer security 
levels were low and security threats were evident.  In this situation, users demonstrated exemplary 
behaviour with their own passwords.  We would argue that the “need-to-know” policy ought to be 
reconsidered and users ought to be told of past or existing (attempted) breaches of security. 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
5.1 Increase communication between users and security experts 
 
The technical bias towards security mechanism has produced a simplistic approach to user 
authentication: restricting access to data by identification and authentication of a user.  This simplistic 
approach may work well in military environments, but limits usable solutions to the security problems 
of modern organisations which seek to encourage work practices such as teamwork and shared 
responsibility.  Such organisations require support for trust and information sharing.  The authoritarian 
approach has also led to security departments’ reluctance to communicate with users.  Informing users 
about security mechanisms and threats is seen as lowering security by increasing the possibility of 
information leaks.  Ultimately, this has lead to a two fold problem:- 
 
1. Users’ lack of security awareness. 
  
2. Security departments’ lack of knowledge about users 
produces security mechanisms and systems which are not 
usable. 
 
These two factors lower users’ motivation to produce secure work practices.  This then reinforces 
security departments’ belief that users are “inherently insecure” and leads to the introduction of stricter 
mechanisms.  Communication between security departments and users is therefore often restricted to 
“ticking off” users caught contravening the rules.  This type of relationship is not suitable for modern 
distributed and networked organisations which encourage communication and collaboration.  This 
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vicious circle needs to be broken by improving communication between security departments and 
users, along with training and user-centred design of security mechanisms. 
 
5.2 Users and password behaviour 
 
Insecure work practices and low security motivation have been identified by information security 
research  (DeAlvare, 1990; Ford, 1994; Gordon, 1995) as a major problem which must be addressed.  
There is, however, no identification by those same researchers as to the cause of these user related 
problems.  Instead, the blame has been squarely placed on the user with a lack of security motivation as 
the reason.  It is assumed that users naturally lack security motivation and that this state will not be 
changed until they have been made aware of, or forced into completing, secure actions. This 
assumption, however, suggests that humans start, as do computers, from a blank sheet that is 
programmed into a certain action.  The truth is that human behaviour is far more complex than simple 
conditioned responses.  Forcing users to complete an action, may only make them circumvent the 
whole procedure giving the appearance  that they have completed that action.  
 The results from this study suggest that if users show insecure security behaviours and have a 
low security motivation, it is often due to the security mechanisms employed.  These mechanisms have 
not been assessed in terms of their compatibility with users’ work practices, organisational strategy and 
usability - factors which we would expect to be considered during the design and implementation of 
most systems today.  Designers of security mechanisms must realise that human and organisational 
factors are a key issue in security design.  Social engineers understand this and have used it to their 
advantage, increasing system security breaches.  Unless security departments understand how their 
mechanisms are used in practice, they will always be doomed to produce mechanisms which look 
secure on paper but fail in practice.  
 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
 
The construction of secure passwords can be assisted by the recommendations given below under 
“content” and “password relationships”.  Users’ motivation to apply these relies on the 
recommendations set out in “security perceptions” and “work practices”. 
 
Password Content 
• Give on-line instruction and training on how to construct usable/secure passwords.  This will 
show users that they need not circumvent security mechanisms in order to construct 
memorable passwords. 
• Give on-line feedback to users on what constitutes an insecure password.  This will 
hopefully aid in users’ knowledge of what not to use in their password design procedures.  
Password Relationships between Multiple Passwords 
• Multiple passwords decrease overall security and memorability which in turn increases 
users’ overheads.  
• If multiple passwords have to be used, a maximum of 4 or 5 is recommended to reach the 
extent of most users’ memory abilities for totally different multiple passwords.  This number 
is reduced if passwords are used infrequently.   
• If more passwords are needed, then users should be advised that they can join the passwords 
(produce several passwords that have related content) to reduce the number.  They should 
also be advised that this could cause memory interference problems unless joint passwords 
are identical which will increase memorability and security (by reducing password 
disclosure).  A possible solution could be presented in a physical format with smart card 
technology giving a second barrier of security which could be used for various systems. 
 
Security Perceptions 
• Give on-line feedback to users of how crackable their password is.  This will identify for 
users the importance of constructing secure passwords and help them to identify those more 
highly crackable. 
• Relay to users the possible threats to the organisations system and information. This will 
increase the users’ concept of perceived threats and thus the need for security measures.  
 13
This measure is especially necessary on sites where security is high and the site is isolated. 
Users perception of threats to security is especially low under these conditions. 
• State the role that password security plays in combating perceived threats. 
• Make explicit the level of sensitivity that different information has. This will reduce the 
degree of arbitrary judgements made by users. 
• State how security levels relate to information sensitivity.  This will indicate how well the 
security conforms to organisational procedures. 
Work Practices 
• Relate enforced password practice to organisational procedures.  This will mean that users 
will identify how relevant security is to their working practices with shared information 
having shared passwords and individual work having personal passwords.  If this is not to be 
adhered to, reasons must be given to the user as to why it is necessary for the security 
mechanisms to circumvent working procedures. 
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